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Recent work shows that inefficient outcomes fail to be evolutionary stable in
games with pre-play communication. However, this result depends upon dríft,
and inefficient outcomes may well persist for long periods of time. This paper
perturbs the model of cheap-talk, and deríves efficiency results which do not
rely upon drift. We consider two types of perturbation. If players make
mistakes in choosing messages, as in Selten (1975), we obtain efficiency in
2x2 games. Our second perturbation íntroduces noise ín the transmission of
messages, so that the message received can be different from the message sent,
without the sender beíng aware of this. In this case we obtaln a powerful
efficiency result for generic games. Since noise restrícts drift, this also
allows us to derive existence results which are stronger than in the existing
literature.
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1. INIRODU(.TION
Consider the unanlmlty game G1, xhich ís a game of pure coordination, wíthout
conflict of ínterest. The game has two strict Nash equilibria, (H,H) and (L,L), and
one in mixed strategies. Till recently, there were not many convincing reasons,
from a purely non-cooperative standpoint, for excluding the sub-optimal equilibríum
(L,L). It has been argued (see for example, Farrell, 1988) that players could
sígnal their intent to play H by pre-play communication. However, these storles are
not fully convincing since it Ss always a Nash equilibrium for both players to
ígnore such communlcation. A second problem was pointed out by Aumann (1990), using
the stag hunt example, where a player would llke to claim that he intends to "hunt
the stag", even if he intends to "hunt the hare".
Recent work has applied evolutlonary arguments to obtaín positive efficiency
results - see Sobel (1993) for an excellent survey. In this setting palrs of
players are randomly drawn from a large populatíon. The players exchange costless
messages, and then play G1. In thls framework, cheap talk de-stabilizes the
inefflcient outcome, since it allows players to signal thelr intention to move to
the efficient outcome costlessly. The basic Sdea behind these models ís the
followíng. Suppose that all players in the population are playíng strategy BAD:
choosing message 1 and playing L irrespective of the message. Let a small fraction
of the population switch to the strategy REFORMFR. REFORMEE2 sends a different
message, message 2, and responds to message 1 by choosing L, and to message 2 by
choosing H. When REFORMER is matched against BAD, ít gets a payoff of 1, and hence
does as well as BAD dces agaínst itself. When REFORMER is matched agaínst itself,
St gets a payoff of 2, whích is strictly greater than the payoff of BAD when
matched agaínst REFORMER. Since REFORMFR has a higher payoff than BAD in the mixed
populatíon, natural selection ensures that REFORMEE2 drives out BAD, so that the
populatlon ends up playing the efficient outcome, (H,H).
Thís argument shows that the strategy BAD is unstable ín a very strong sense -z
it takes but a single arbitrarily small mutation, introducing REFORMER ínto this
population, and natural selection dces the rest of the work in eliminatíng BAD. BAD
fails to be Lyapunov stable or neutrally stable. we can therefore be confident that
BAD will be eliminated in a relatively short time. Unfortunately, this is not true
in general. As section 2 of this paper makes clear, there are very many inefficient
strategíes which are neutrally stable, and which cannot therefore be eliminated
quickly. An example of such a strategy is DICTATOR, which sends message 1, and
plays L in response to message 1, but punishes any deviant message by playing the
mixed strategy (2~3 L, 1~3 H). REFORlgR gets a payoff on only 2I3 agaínst DICTATOR,
and hence cannot Snvade a population playing DICTATOR. To rule out DICTATOR (and
other inefficient strategies) one must rely upon drift. Starting from a populatíon
which plays DICTATOR, let a small fraction switch, due to random mutatíon, to
playing BAD. HAD and DICTATOR have equal payoffs in this mixed population. Hence,
with many mutations, the proportion of BAD can increase in this population, until
DICTATOR is eliminated. At this point REFORMEI2 can enter and displace BAD.
Formally, DICTATOR is neutrally stable but does not belong to an Evolutionary
Stable set (or asymptotically stable set) of strategies.
This mechanlsm based on drift is problematic since it can take a long time,
due to St reliance upon the accumulation of small random mutations.i Inefficient
outcomes can therefore persist for very long periods of time before they are
eliminated. For example, if in each period a fraction e of the population switch
randomly from one strategy to another ( eg. from DICTATOR to BAD or vice-versa),
the expected tlme before a populatíon playing DICTATOR switches to fiAU ir-: ul thc
order IIc2. This problem is acknowledged by Kim and Sobel ( 1994, p13): "the
arguments in our proofs suggest that convergence ( to a stable set) could be
slow...the population could remain at an inefficient outcome for a long time." In
our view, slow convergence is a serious problem ín the human context; the pace of
technological and social change is such that the underlying game may ítself change3
before inefficiency is eliminated.
A second problem with the existing líterature is that existence results are
very weak. Kim and Sobel (1994) obtain existence results only for games of common
interest. Thus ES sets do not exist for games such as the battle of the sexes. Here
again, drift plays an important role ln destabilizing equilíbria.
This paper asks, can we expect the fast evolution of effíciency in games with
pre-play communication.2 We operationalize thís notion by not relying upon drift
for the purposes of eliminating inefficient outcomes - we seek to get our
efficiency results by showing that ínefficient outcomes are unstable, i.e. not
neutrally stable. (We do not however weaken our existence requirements, since our
exístence results are obtained using the criterion that equilibrium strategies
belong to ES sets). If a strategy faiis to be neutrally stable, it only requires a
stngle arbitrarily small mulaLion which introduces the superior stral.egy. 1'hc
unstable strategy wíll then be eliminated purely due to its lower payoff, without.
requiring any further mutation. As section 2 of this paper makes clear, neutral
stability does not imply efficíency even when the underlying game is as simple as
G1. In part the problem arises because behavior at unreached information sets
(actions after unused messages in our context) is not subject to any selection
pressure. We therefore perturb the cheap talk game, and consider two different
types of perturbation. The first perturbation is familiar, and ís in the spirit of
Selten (1975, 1983) - players make místakes in choosing messages, so that all
messages are chosen with positive probabilíty. This perturbation allows us to get
positive efficiency results for 2x2 games - we show that íf a strategy is neutrally
stable, it must be approxímately efficient (i.e. the payoff converges to the
efficient payoff as mistakes go to zero). Unfortunately the efficiency result does
not generalize when the underlying game has three or more actions per player.
This leads us to consider a second, novel perturbation. We introduce noise in
the transmission of inessages - when player 1 sends message m, there is a small4
probabilíty that player 2 receives a dífferent message, say message m'. When this
happens, the sender is not aware that player 2 has índeed received message m'. This
noise creates the possíbilíty of a mis-understanding, since neither the messages
sent nor the messages received are mutual knowledge between the players. Noise has
powerful effects, and dramatically restricts the set of Nash equilibria of the
cheap talk game. This alloxs us to prove a strong exact efficiency result Sn
general games - in any game satisfying a regularity assumptíon, inefficíent
outcomes fail to be neutrally stable. Our formulation of noise is of independent
ínterest, even outside the evolutionary context. Noise has such powerful effects in
restricting the equilibrium set essentially because the sequential equílíbrium
correspondence of the cheap-talk game fails to be lower-hemicontinuous in the level
of noise at the point of zero noise.
We also obtain stronger existence results than the existing líterature. We
require that efficient outcomes be asymptotically stable, i.e. elements of
Evolutíonary Stable sets. These perturbations also allow us to get stronger
existence results than usual. In either formulation, if the underlying game has a
Nash equilibrium whích is efficient ( i.e. maximizes the sum of payoffs of the two
players), this outcome belongs to an Evolutionary stable set. Thus we ensure
existence in games such as the battle of the sexes. Our results imply that
inefficient outcomes wíll be destabilized quickly (by a single mutation), and once
the population coordinates on an efficient outcome, it stays there.
The organization of the rest of this paper is as follows. Section 2 sets out
the basic model of pre-play communication, ín the absence of mistakes or noise. We
review the efficiency results obtained by others, and díscuss the reasons why
inefficient outcomes may be neutral stable. We show that if one does not want to
rely on drift, and allow for randomized actions, we need to assume that players
have infinitely many messages at their disposal. Section 3 introduces mistakes in
the spirit of Selten. Section 4 discusses the effects of noise . Section 5 shows5
that our assumption that players have infinitely many messages is important, by
providing an inefficiency result with finite message sets. The final section
concludes.
2. Ti~ BASIC CiIEAP iALK GAlIE
Let the underlying gane, G- ~{1,2},AI,A2,ui,u2~ be a Cinite two-player normal
form game, where 1 and 2 are the two roles in the game, A1 and A2 are finite action
sets, A- A-AIxA2, and ui:A~R, 1-1,2 are the payoff functions, which are extended
to the set of míxed action profíle AAIxAA2, by takíng expected payoffs. The
underlying game G defínes an asymmetric contest (see Selten, 1980 or van Damme
1991). A behavior strategy in this asymmetric contest is a palr a-(al,a2) e
AAIx~A2. The payoff of strategy a against strategy S is:
u(a.s) :- (ul(a1,R2) 4 u2(a2,d1)112 (2.1)
An action pair a' e A is utllitarian or efficlent if a' is an action pair
whích maximizes the ex-ante expected payoff for each of a pair of players, before
the roles are assigned, i.e. if u(a',a') ? u(a,a) tl a e A.
G is compatible if it has a strict Nash equilibrium whích is utilítarían i.e.
3 a' -(ai,a2) whích is utílitarian, such that uí(a') ~ ui(ai,a;), tl aie A1, 1-1,2,
j-3-i.
G ís of common interest if ít has a uníque weakly Pareto-efficient action
pair, i. e. 3 a e A: ul(a) ~ ul(a) and u2(a) ~ u2(a) d a E A-{a).
In asymmetric contests, the utilitarian notíon of efficiency is clearly more
appropriate than the Paretian notion, since ex-ante players may occupy either role.
Note that i f G ís ot common interest then it is compatible. The converse is not
true as the game G2 shows. Existing results usually apply to common lnterest games,
whilst our results will apply to the larger class of compatible games.
The cheap talk game, G', assocíated wíth G, is as follows. Players are
randomly drawn from a íarge ( infinite) population, and paired. Each player is6
assigned a role, S.e. role 1 or role 2. Each player sends a message from a set of
messages, M. The set M may be fínite or countably infinite, but contains at least
two elesents. After these messages are exchanged, the players play G. Payoffs in
the cheap talk game, G', do not depend upon the messages exchanged and depend only
upon the actlons taken Sn G.
A local behavior strategy in role 1, xi, is a pair (ci,91) where Qi e GM, and
9i: NxM-~AAi. A behavior strategy in the cheap talk game, x, is a pair (xi.x2). x
can also be written as the pair ( v,e), where Q-(ci,c2) and 9 z(61,62). Let S
denote the set of behavior strategies in G'. The expected payoff of strategy x
against x'z(Q',9') is given by:




The expected payoff of strategy x in a mixed population where fractíon (1-e)
play x and fraction e play y is given by:
u(x;(1-e)xtey) :- (1-e) u(x,x) t e u(x,y) (2.3)
Definition 2.1: x e S is a neutrally stable strategy (NSS) if and only if
there exists e', 0 ~ e'~ 1, such that d e E[0, e') and d y e S:
u(x;(1-e)xtey) ~ u(y;(1-e)xtey) (2.4)
Remark: In games with a finite number of pure strategíes (i.e. where S ís
finite dimensional), definition 2.1 is equivalent to 2.1':
Definition 2.1': If S ís finite dimensíonal, x ís a NSS iff V y e S:
u(x,x) ~ u(y,x)
u(y,x) - utx,x) y ~(x,y) ~ U(y,y)
van Damme (1991) shows that in finíte games, any NSS satisfying def)nition
(2.1') has a uniform invasíon barrier. The equivalence of the two definítíons does
not extend to games where the set of pure strategies is countably or uncountably7
infinite. For example, consíder an x such that V y, u(x,x) ~ u(y,x) so that x is a
strict Nash equílibrium and hence satísfies (2.1'). Nevertheless, there may be a
sequence ~yn~, such that the limít of u(yn,x) equals u(x,x), whíle the limit of
u(yn,yn) is strictly greater than the limit of u(x,yn). In this case there is no
uniform invasíon barríer e'. See Bomze and Potscher (1989) and Bhaskar (1992) for
further details.
Defínition 2.2 For x,y e S, x D y if u(x,x) - u(y,x) and u(x,y) - u(y,y)
The symmetric binary relation D formalizes our notion of drift. Note that íf x
D y and z- 1x t(i-a)y for a E f0,11. z D x. Hence íf the population starts at x,
and y D x, the accumulation of small mutatíons can cause the population to drift to
y. Even if x is a NSS, y may not be so that the population can move far from x. An
Evolutionary Stable set (Thomas, 1985) is a closed set of NSS which is not
vulnerable to drift.
Definition 2.3 A closed set L S B is an Evolutionary Stable set (ES set) if
i) x eL~x isaNSS
ii) if xE LandyDx, thenyeL.
An ES set repels mutants from outside this set. If the population is playing
any strategy in this set, and any mutant enters with fraction below e', the mutant
has strictly lower payoff in the mixed populatíon, and is dríven out.
Remark: There is a close link between evolutionary stability and dynamic
stability under the (míxed-strategy) replicator dynamics. Taylor and Jonker (1978)
showed that evolutionary stable strategies are asymptotically stable.3 Bomze and
van Damme (1992) show the converse uith mixed strategy dynamícs. These results
extend naturally to the relation between ES sets and asymptotically stable sets,
and the relation between neutrally stable strategies and Lyapunov stability
(Thomas, 1985).4 ,
We state the following proposition without proof, since it ís without claim to
origínalíty - it is essentially a translation of results obtained by others (Kim8
and Sobel, 1994; Schlag, 1994) to our framework.
Proposition O í) G' has an ES set if and only~if G ís of common interest.
ii) If G is of common interest, and x belongs to an ES set of G', x is
utilitarlan.
We have two remarks in this context.
Resark 1: (i) is extremely restrictive. Consíder game G2; since a player may
be alloted either role, this has a unique ex-ante efficient outcome, (T,L), which
is also a strict Nash equilibrlum. Nevertheless, the corresponding game with cheap
talk fails to have an ES set. The actions of players after unsent messages is not
sub~ect to selection pressure, and therefore drift destablizes the outcome (T,L).
we discuss this game in more detail in the next section.
Remark 2: (li) does not apply if ES set is replaced by neutral stability,
i.e. inefficient outcomes can be neutrally stable. This is true even in the
simplest case of a 2x2 unanimity game G1 Sf we consider mixed strategies.s There
are two distínct reasons why inefficient outcomes may be neutrally stable even in
G1'.
No wiused messages : If M is finite with cardinality IM~, there may be no
unused messages for a mutant to use. Consider the strategy BABBLE; this
randomizes with equal probability between all messages and chooses L after every
message, wíth a payoff of 1 against itself. Any mutant whích plays H agaínst ítself
(such as the strategy REFORMER discussed in the introductíon) ís not a best
response to BABBLE since its payoff against BABBLE ís 1-lI~M~, which is strictly
less than 1. This problem can be solved only if M contains (at leastl a countable
ínfinity of inessages. In thls case, given any incumbent strategy, arrange the
messages according to the probability with which they are used. For every 5~0,
there exísts N(8) such that messages greater than N(ó) are used with total
probability less than S. We now show that BABBLE cannot be a NSS, since there is no
uníform invasion barrier e'. Given any e'~0, let á(e') - e'~(1-e'), and let9
REFORMER use messages greater than N(ó(e' )). It is easy to verify that REFORMI6R
does stríctly better than BABBI.E in the míxed population.
It is clear that if one wants to get strong efficlency results using neutral
staDílity, one must allow for infinltely many messages, so that there are always
messages available which are used with almost no probability. Indeed, given any
incumbent strategy, all but a finite number of inessages are used with almost no
probability, so that in thís case "most" messages can be used by mutants to sígnal
to each other. We do not find the assumption that agents have infínite message sets
unreasonable, at least in the context of human interaction. Note that the
literature which seeks to refine cheap-talk equilibria has to make even stronger
assumptions in order to get results - Farrell (1993) for example assumes that
message sets are "open-ended" so that there are always neologisms (new messages)
which a player can create.
When we perturb the cheap talk game, for example by assuming that players
make mistakes, all messages will be sent with positive probability at any strategy
profile. The problem of a lack of unused messages arises even if we use stronger
criteria such as ES set. In section 5 we show that infinite message sets are
essential for efficiency results - with finite message sets we fínd that even ES
sets can be inefficlent.
Punishment of deviant e~essages: The second problem is that inefficient
strategies (like regimes) can increase their longevity by punishing potential
reformers - specifically by punish)ng deviant messages. Consider the strategy
DICTATOR (which we discussed in the ínt.roductlon). DICTATOR chooses message 1, and
responds to message 1 by playing N, but plays (2I3L;1~3H) after any deviant
message. Any strategy which tries to signal usíng a different message is punished
by DICTATOR, and gets a payoff of at most 2~3. DICTATOR thereby ensures that it
cannot be invaded by a strategy like REFORMER.
:DICTATOR uses a randomized punishment to punísh REFORMER. Although this10
puníshment is not a NSS of the underlying game G, it is not sub~ect to selection
pressure, since deviant messages are never sent in a population playing DICTATOR.
Thís suggests that if players make mistakes is sending messages, as ín Selten
(1975), DICTATOR may no longer be viable. We find that this is the case. Further,
in 2x2 games, punishment of deviant messages is not possible since such punishments
have necessarlly to be via mixed strategies. However, in more general games,
deviant messages can be punished by reverting to a strict Nash equilibrium of G. In
thís case mistakes have no effect, and we have to introduce noise in the
transmission of inessages ín order to rule out punishíng strategies.
Jotntly-controlled randomlzation: The third problem is that players may use
cheap-talk to generate (an inefficient) jointly controlied lotteries over the Nash
equílibria of G. The simplest example (due to Kim and Sobel, 1992) is when the
underlying game is G1. Let the set of inessages be (1,2}, and consíder the strategy
JCL which sends message 1 with probability one-half and message 2 with probability
one-half. If the messages exchanged coincide, the strategy plays L; íf they differ,
the strategy plays H. The payoff of JCL against itself is 1.5.
It is easy to show that JCL ís not neutrally stable in the asymmetric contest
it players can condition their strategies upon the role they fill. Consider the
mutant which sends message 1 in role 1, and message 2 in role 2, but plays the same
actions as JCL after exchanged messages. The payoff of this mutant agaínst JCL is
1.5, but its payoff against itself is 2.6 ~
This observatíon is easily generalized. Suppose the G is a game of ~nmmon
tnterest over equlllbria, í.e. a game where the Nash equilibrla of G can be be
Pareto ordered. Jointly controlled randomization over the Nash equilibria of G can
never be a neutrally stable in G'. To see this, let the mutant simply ciioose lhe
message pair which induces the best Nash equilíbrium of G, and choose actions as
JCL. Since all messages used by JCL must have the same payoff agaínst JCL, the
mutant is a best response to JCL which does strictly better against itself.11
Consider the game G3, whích ís a game of comteon interest, but without common
interest over equilibrla - players have conflicting interests over the two
inefficíent equílibria (L,M) and (M,L), but these are Pareto-dominated by (H,H).
Consider the strategy JCR whích randomizes with equal probability between messages
1 and 2. If the realized messages coincide, JCR plays (L,M); íf they are (1,2) or
(2,1) JCR plays (M,L). If either player receíves a message different from 1 or 2
(say message 3), the player plays M. The payoffs to various message combinations
are shown in Fig. 4. If a mutant sends a message different from 1 or 2 ln order to
recognize each other and coordinate on (H,H), this mutant is punished by JCR. This
can be verifled from Fig. 4 whích shows that the expected payoff to message 1 or 2
when playing agaínst JCR is 1.5, whereas the expected payoff to message 3 is 1.
Hence such a mutant cannot invade JCR.
JCR is a NSS of the cheap talk game. Furthermore, as we show in section 4,
since JCR plays a jointly controlled lottery, ít continues to be a NSS even in the
game with noíse. Nevertheless, the game G3 is exceptional, and JCR will not be a
NSS of G3' if we perturb the payoffs in G3 siightly. The critícal feature of this
example is that the sum of payoffs to the two roles at (L,M) equals the sum at
(M,L). Hence we can show that if the underlyíng game ís generic, jointly controlled
randomization will not be neutrally stable in the cheap talk game.
A strategy which performs a Jointly controlled lottery, as in the example
above, can be viewed as playing a mixed strategy over messages, where the payoffs
are constructed using the Nash equílibria of G. Neutral stability of this strategy
is therefore closely related to the neutral stability of mixed strategy Nash
equllibría in asymmetric contests. Although míxed strategíes are never evolutionary
stable in asymmetric contests, (Selten, 1980), there exist examples of mixed
strategies that are neutrally siable - for example, mixed strategy Nash equílibria
of a constant-sum game. In a companion paper (Bhaskar, 1994, 'fheorem 2). 1 show
that such examples are rare - if G satisfies a regularity condition, which is12
generically satisfied, a mixed strategy equilibrium of G cannot be neutrally
stable. The same condition alao rules out 3ointly controlled randomization in the
cheap talk game.
Define the following:
If a e A, let u(a) :s ul(a) t u2(a).
supp(c) :- (m e MxM: a~(m) ~ 0)
REGUi.ARITY ASSUl~fION : The payoffs in the underlying game G satisfy:
R1 No payoff ttes tn equtltbrtum: If a- (a1,a2) is a pure strategy Nash
equilíbrium, a is a strict equilibrium.
R2 Let a,a',a",a"" e A.
If u(a) t u(a' )- u(a" ) t u(a"" ), then a- a' - a" - a""
Lemoa 2.1 Let G satísfy the regularity assumption:
1) any NSS of G is in pure strategies.
11) If x-(v,6) is a NSS of G', where 6:MxM~A, then 9 is a constant
function on supp(Q).
Proof Part (1) of the lemma is proved in a companion paper (Bhaskar, 1994,
lemma 3), where it is shown that if a mixed strategy p L(p1,pZ), ís a NSS of the
asymmetric contest only if payoffs in G satisfy the following condition: consider
the restricted game associated with p, i.e. the game where each player 1 has pure
strategy set supp(pi), the set of pure strategies in the support of pi. In the
restricted game, consider any pair of pure strategies for player 1, h and i, and
any pair of pure strategies for player 2, j and k. Payoffs in the restrícted game
must satísfy:
u(h,3) t u(i,k) - u(h,k) t u(i,3) (2.5)
where u(h,~) is the sum of the payoffs of the two players at the strategy
combination (h,j), and so on. Hence part (1) of the lemma follows.
In the case of jointly controlled randomization, if player 1 uses messages h
and i with positive probability and player 2 uses messages 3 and k, the payoffs to13
these message combinations must satisfy (2.5). By the hypothesis of the lemma,
these payoffs must be constructed using the pure action combínations of G so that
there must be a combination which víolates R2. o
Note that Lemma 2.1 does not restrict players actions after unsent messages,
and hence does not rule out strategies which punish deviant messages. Hence
perturbíng the cheap talk game i s essential if we are to rule out such punishments.
3. MISTAKES
We now allow for the possibility that players may make mistakes in sending
messages. This ensures that all messages are sent with positive probability, so
that there are no unsent messages. This formulation, of the "trembling-hand", was
introduced by Selten (]975), in order to refíne Nash equilibria. Selten (1983)
extended the idea to the evolutionary context, suggesting the notion of "limit ESS"
in order to alleviate the existence problems for ESS in extensive form games. In
our paper mistakes will play a dual role: on the one hand, they help refine the set
of neutrally stable strategies, by introducing selection pressure at information
sets which are otherwise unreached. On the other hand, mistakes also restricts
drift, thereby allowing ES sets to exist in a larger class of games.
Let M, the set of inessages be the set of natural numbers.
Let p- ~pn~ be a probabílity measure on M, with full support.
Let n~ 0 be a small positive number.
The cheap take game with mistakes, GM(n), is as follows:
1. Players are randomly matched and assigned roles. Each player chooses a
message from M.
2. For each player, the chosen message is sent with probability (1-n). With
probability n, the player makes a"mistake". Mistakes are independent across
players. If the player makes a mistake, a message is selected from M by the
probability measure p, and the player sends this message.14
3. Players observe each others messages, and choose randomized actions from
AA1. Payoffs depend only on the actiona chosen.
Note that GN(n) and G' have the same strategy sets, S, and Gy(0) L G`. The




The payoff of x in the sixed population (1-e)x } cy is:
u(x;(1-c)xtey;n) :~ (1-e) u(x,x,n) t e u(x,Y,n) (3.2)
Ne want to defíne x to be neutrally stable in GM if the payoff of x is weakly
greater than the payoff of any other strategy y, provided that n and e are both
"small". Since we have two "perturbatíons", mistakes and mutations, the order in
which we take limits could potentlally be important.~ However, the results all our
efficiency and existence results, in this section and the next, do not depend upon
the relatíve importance of mistakes versus mutations. Accordingly, we províde two
alternative definitions of both our solution concepts (NSS and ES sets), and prove
our effíciency results using the weak definítion of NSS, and our existence result
with the strong definition of ES set.
Definition 3.1 (Yeak Definition) x e S is a weak NSS of GN if 3 n` ~ 0: V n
E(O,n'), 3 e'(n): V e e[O,e'(n)]:
u(x;(1-e)xtey;n) ~ u(Y;(1-e)xtey;n)
Definition 3.2 (Strong Definition) x e S is a strong NSS of GM íf 3 c'~o, n'
~ 0: Vr~ e (O,n'), V e E (O,e' ):
u(x;(i-c)x4eY:n) i u(y:(1-e)xteY:n)
Observe that if x is a strong NSS of GN, it is a weak NSS. For our effíciency
result, we shall prove that inefficient outcomes are not weak NSS.15
Definition 3.3 x D(n) y if and oniy if
u(x.x,n1 - u(Y,x,n) and u(x,Y.n) - u(Y,Y.n)
Definition 3.4 L s S is an weak ES set of GM if
i) x e L e x is a weak NSS of GM
ii) if x e L and y D(n) x for n e(~7',0), then y e L.
Definition 3.5 L S S is an strong ES set of GM if
i) x e L e x is a strong NSS of GM
ii) if x e L and y D(n) x for n E(n',0), then y e L.
Observe that if L is a strong ES set of GM, it is a weak ES set. We shall use
the strong version of ES set for our existence results.
Given a e A, xe define the subset of S, f2(a) as follows:
SI(a) :- ((a,6) e S: 8(m) - a V m e MxM}
EXISTENCE
We begin by proving our existence result, in proposition 1.
PROPOSITION 1(EXISTENCE) If G is a compatible game, GM has a strong ES set
which induces the utilitarian outcome.
Proof Let a" be the efficient strict Nash equilibrium of G. We show that
fl(a') is an F.S set in GM by the strong definit.ion. l.et x e f2 and n ~ 0. l.et y E R.
implying that for some m, y(m) ~ a". Sínce a" is a strict Nash equilibrium, u(y,x)
~ u(x,x), implying not y D(n) x for any n~0.
We now show that any x e f](a"), is neutrally stable since there exists a e"
which is a uniform invasion barrier against any y. This follows since a" is a
stríct Nash equilibrium, and a' is efficient. Let a'~a' so that u(a',a') ~
u(a',a'). Then there exists e'(a') such that (3.3) is positive for all e~e'(a').
(1-e)[ula',a")-u(a'a")1 t e[u(a",a') - u(a',a")} (3.3)
Let e" - min {e'(a'):a'e A-{a'}}
Let x e t7, and given any n, let y play a' against x with probability n, and
play actíon a' against x with probability (1-n). The difference in payoffs between16
x and y in the mixed population is
u(x;(1-c)x}ey,rl) - u(y;(1-e)xtey,n) ~ ex[u(a`,a') - u(y,y,rl)1
(3.4)
t ((1-e)(1-x)(u(a`,a')-u(a',a`)} s (1-A)[u(a',a')-u(Y.Y.n)1)
If e ~ e`, the term in curly brackets {} ís positive. Since a` ís efficíent,
u(a',a`) ? u(y,y,n). Hence for any n, e` ís an invasion barrier for any x e R(a`)
against any y~ t)(a'). o
Constrast Propositions 0 and 1; the latter generalizes the existence result
from the class of common interest games to the class of compatible games. This
distinction is Sllustrated by compatible game G2, which has an efficient Nash
equilibrium (T,L). The game wlth cheap talk, but wíthout noise, fails to have an ES
set. Consider the strategy x which sends message 1 in both roles, and plays (T,L)
after every message pair. Message 2 is never sent by x, so that the response to
message 2 can change via drift arbitrarily. Hence x can be replaced by the strategy
y which sends 1 in both roles, plays (T,L) in after (1,1), but plays (B,L) after
any other message pair. Consider strategy z, which sends message 2 ín either role,
and plays which always plays T irrespective of the message ín role 1, and plays L
in role 2 after (2,2) and R after (1,2). u(y,y) - 2 whereas u(z,y) 3 2.5, so that
y is driven out by z.
Nith mistakes, the population cannot drift from x to y, since y is not a best
response to x in the perturbed game. Without drift, z cannot enter since (B,R) is
inefficient as compared to (T,L), and (T,L) ís a strict Nash equilibrium.
EFFICIENCY
Me now turn to efficiency, to showing that in 2x2 games, inefficíent outcomes
are unstable. However, the efficiency result ís approximate, as the following
definition makes clear.
Definition 3.6 x is approximately efficlent íf u(x,n) converges to the
efficient payoff u(a`,a') as n tends to zero.
PROPOSITION 2(EFFICIFNCY) If G ís a 2x2 game satisfying ihe regularíty17
assumption R, and x is a weak NSS of GM, x is approxímately effícient.
The basic ídea of the proof is to show that an inefficient strategy cannot
punish any invading mutant. Since all messages are received with positive
probability, the response after any message must be a NSS of G. In 2x2 games,
there are at most two NSS, which restricts punishment possibilities. This rules
out strategies like DICTATOR which punish devíant signals. A mutant can therefore
invade this inefficient strategy and coordinate on the efficient outcome. This
basic argument is somewhat complicated by the the possibility of jointly controlled
randomization, which we discuss later.
Lenma 3.1 Let x-(v;0) be a weak NSS of any cheap talk game (i.e. G` or
GM(p1. If m- ( ml,m2) is a message sent with positive probability, then 0(m) 1s an
NSS of G.
Proof: Let a - O(m') not be an NSS of G so that there exists Se AA1xAA2
which can invade a in the asymmetríc contest defined by G. Let y-(0',8') where
0'(m) - 0(m) V m E m', and 0(m') - S.
u(y;(1-e)xiey)-u(x;(1-e)xtey) - prob(m)Iu((3:(1-e)ates)- u(a;(1-e)ates)I (3.5)
Since prob(m) is positive, and S can invade a, x is not a NSS. o
We are now ín a position to prove proposition 2.
Proof of Proposition 2: By lemma 2.1 and the regularity assumption, G has at
most two NSS, which are strict equilibria. Label these a and a'. Let x-(a',0) be a
NSS of GM. By lemma 3.1 let 0(m)- a or 0(m) - a' for any m e supp(P). Further, by
lemma Z.1 0 is constant on supp(Q), so let 0(m1 - a V m e supp(o~).
We now show that if Ofm) t a V m e MxM, then a is efficient. Let m E supp(a)
such that 0(m) ~ a. If n~0, by lemma 3.1 0(m) must equal a'. We claim that:
ui(a) ~ uí(a'), i -1,Z- (3.6)
If not, consider the strategy y, which sends mí (the i-th component of m)
instead of ví, but is otherwise the same as x. If (3.6) does not apply, the reverse
inequality must hold (by the regularity assumption there are no payoff ties at pure18
Nash equilibria of G). Hence u(y,x) ~ u(x,x) so that x is not a NSS.
(3.6) and the fact that a and a' are strict Nash equilibria implies the
inequality:
ui(g) ~ ui(a') ~ ui(ai,a~) for 1~1,2, j~3-i. ...... (3.7)
Hence a Pareto dominates all other outcomes and is hence utilitarian. We
have therefore proved that Sf a Ss inefflcíent, B ís constant on MxM.
If a is inefficient, let a' be the efficient action pair. We now show that x
is not a weak NSS. The probabllíty with which message n is sent by x ís (1-n)Pn }
nPn. Let ó~0 be given. Consider the following sets:
{n E M: Pn ~ á~2)
(n E M: {~n t á~2 }
Since Qn and pn are convergent series, both the above sets contain all but
a finite number of elements of N. Let the mutant strategy select a message ín the
intersection of these two sets. For any rl, thls message is sent by x with
probability less than á. Hence the mutant can use such messages to signal and
swítch to the efficient outcome. Since the mutant plays as x dces after messages
which arise with high probability, the mutant's payoff loss when matched against x
can be made arbitrarily small. Hence x is not a weak NSS. o
Remark 1. The efficiency result is approximate, since the strategy can choose
actions which are lnefficient after messages which only sent by mistake. Consider
the unanimity game G1, and let x send message 1, play (H,H) after the message pair
(1,1), and play (L,L) after any other message. x is a NSS whích is approxímately
efficient, and u(x,x) ~(1-n)22 ;(1-(1-n)211, which converges to 2 as n tends to
zero.
The efficiency result dces not generalize when the underlying game, G, is
3x3 or more, since in this case G may have more than two pure strategy Nash
equilibria. Consider the 3x3 unanimity game, G5, which has three strict Nash
equilibria. Consider the strategy PFRFECT DICTATOR, whlch sends message 1, and19
plays M after the message pair (1,1), and plays L after any other message. Since
PERFECT DICTATOR plays a strict Nash equilibrium after every message paír, it
satisfies the condition of lemma 3.1. Any mutant sending a devíant message is
punished, and gets a payoff of 1, and is hence not (even approximately) a best
response to PERFECT DICTATOR. Hence PERFECT DICTATOR is an inefficient NSS of the
cheap talk game with mistakes. This example is fully robust. We therefore consider
a dífferent perturbation of the cheap talk game, in the following section.
4. NOISY CONMUNICATION
We now consíder a dlfferent perturbation of the cheap talk game. Rather than
assuming that a player makes a mistake, we assume that there is some noise in the
transmissíon of inessages. Suppose player 1 sends message m to player 2. With hígh
probability player 2 receives message m; however, wíth a small probability, player
2 receives a different message, say message m'. When this happens, player 1 is not
aware that this has índeed occurred. In other words, player 1 knows the message he
sent, and the message that he received, but does not know the message actually
received by player 2, nor the message sent by player 2. This type of noise in the
transmission of inessages can lead to a misunderstanding. The possibility of a
misunderstanding seems ever present whenever there is communication between agents,
and ít is thís that we take into account. The cheap talk game with noise, GN(p), is
as follows:
1. Players are randomly matched and assigned roles. The player in role i
chooses a message from M.
2. Nature moves, independently for the two players. With probability (1-p),
player j receives the message sent by í. With probabílity n, ~ receives a
different message; in this case the message received by j ís selected from M by the
probability measure It.
3. Player i only observes the message he receives; he does not observe the20
wesasge that ~ sent, nor the wessage that J receives. Players choose randowized
actíons frow AA1. Payoffs depend only on the actions chosen.
Let wi denote the wessage sent by player 1 and let r1F M denote the sessage
received by player ~. Note that r' doea not necessarlly equal wi. Let v(r~~wi)
denote the conditional probability that the wessage recelved by ~ Sa r, given that
wi was sent by 1.
v(r~Iwi) ~ (1-n) } ~(r,) if r~ ~ wi
a ~(r,) if r3 í wi (4.1)
The action taken by 1, 91, is now a functíon of wi and ri. 1'he payoff of





Note that if wi is a wessage whích is not sent by í, 91(wi,r,) can be
cowpletely arbitrary since it dces not affect payoffs.
ihe definitíons of neutral stability and ES sets in the noisy cheap talk gaae
are exactly as in definitions 3.1-3.5, with the GN replacing GM in these
definitlons.
The existence result is the sawe as in section 3. The proof is owitted since
it is the sawe as the proof of Proposition 1.
PROPOSITION 3(Ei(ISTt]1CE) If G ís a cowpatible gawe, GM has a strong ES set
which induces the utllitarian outcowe.
No1se allows us to get a significantly stronger efficíency result provided
that G satiafies the regularity assuwption.
PAOPOSITIpi 4(EFFICIE]!CY) Let G be a norwal forw gawe satisfying thezl
regularity assumption. If x is a weak NSS of GN, x is efficient.
COROLLARY If G satisfíes the regularíty assumptíon, x is a weak NSS of GM if
and only íf x belongs to a strong ES set.
They key to the proof of Proposition 4 is the observation that strategies
that punish deviant messages, such as the strategy PERFECT DICTATOR in G5~` (or
DICTATOR in G1') are sub-optimal in the presence of noise - although they are
subgame oerfect equilibria in the game without noise, they are not even Nash
equilibria of the perturbed game. Recall that PERFECT DICTATOR (abbreviated to PD
henceforth) is an inefficient NSS in the game with mistakes. PD sent message 1,
and chose M Sf the other player had sent message 1, but chose. L after any other
message. PD is not a Nash equilibríum wíth noisy communication. The payoff of PD
against itself is:
u(PD,PD) -(1-n)2 2 t 2n(1-n)x0 t n2 1 (4.3)
The payoff of BAD2, the strategy which sends message 1 and chooses M
irrespeciive of the message, against PERFECT DICTATOR ís:
u(BAD2,PD) -[(1-n)2 t n(1-n)] 2 i(n(1-p) t n21 0 (4.4)
The dífference in payoffs is:
u(BAD2,PD) -u(PD,PD) - n(1-p)2 - n21 (4.5)
which is strictly positive for n sufficiently small.
The above example shows that the sequential equilibrium correspondence of the
cheap talk game fails to be lower-hemicontinuous in n at the point n- O. This is
shown more generally in lemma 4.1. Recall from lemma 2.1 that if G satisfíes the
regularity assumption, 91 is constant on supp(Q). In this case player i does not
condítion his action on the message he sent. Hence, 91 may be, without loss of
generality be laken to be a function from M~ to Ai.
Lemma 4.1 Let x-(c,6), let 9~(m~,r~) - a~ tl r~ E supp(o'í), where a-
(ai,a,) is a pure strategy Nash equílíbrium of G. If x is a Nash equilibrium of
GM(n) for n~0 and suffíciently small, 91(m) - aí d m e supp(aí)xM~, 1-1,2, j-3-i.22
Proof Since 6,(supp(c)) a a~,, ~ plays a, with probability greater than (1-n).
Thls probability is lndependent of the message received by i, sínce the nolse Ss
Sndependent. Since gi is a etrict best response to g,, it is also strict best
responae to 9~ for n sufficiently ssall. Hence if r~~0, player i must play gí after
~Y m~ - 0
Proof of Propomition 4. If G satisfies the regularíty condition and x~(o,9)
Ss a NSS of GN, lemmata 2.1 and 4.1 imply that 91(m) a~1 (a constant action) v m E
supp(ci)xM~, for 1~1,2, ~~3-1. The rest of the proof is along the lines of the
proof of propoaition 2, and 1s hence abbrevlated. If ~ ls not efficient, let the
mutant choose messages which occur with arbitrarily small probability under x, and
play the efficient action after receiving such a message, and play g otherwíse. ..o
Remark 1. In contrast with proposítlon 2 the efficiency result here is exact
- approximately efficient strategiea are not Nash equilibria by lemma 4.1.
We now return to the example of game G3 to show that if the regularíty
assumption is not satisfied, jointly controlled randomlzation may allow an
inefficient outcome to persist even in the presence of noise. Recall that the
strategy JCR sent messages 1 and 2 with equal probability, and played (L,M) if the
messages exchanged coinclded, and (M,L) if they differed. If the other player sent
a dlfferent message (say message 3), JQ2 plays M. The payoffs to messages are shown
in Fig. 4. Although JQ2 punishes deviant messages, this is not ruled out wíth noísy
messages. In fact it is optimal to play M after message 3 in a population of JCR
players. If I recelve message 3 in such a population, this must be due to noíse.
Mith probability one-half my opponent has sent message 1 and wíth probabality one-
half he has sent sessage 2. Hence, independently of my message, he !s equally
likely to play actions L and M, making M a strict best response. In other words,
the punishment of deviant messages by playing M is optimal in the presence of
noise.23
Although JCR is neutrally stable, St dces not belong to an ES set, i.e. the
corollary to proposition 4 also faíls without the regularity assumption. Consider
the strategy SIMPLE which sends message 1 in both roles, and takes the same actions
as JCR. It ls clear that SIMPLE 7J JCR, so that SI[~fPLE can be replaced by JCR via
drift. However, SIMPLE ís not a Nash equílíbrium of the game with noise (by lemma
4.1), and can hence be replaced by the strategy whích plays (L,M) irrespectíve of
the message, which can then be invaded by a mutant which coordinates on (H,H).8
To summarize, we have proved existence and efficiency results for the class
of compatible games satisfying the regularíty condition. This implies that if the
underlyfng game is generic, one can expect cooperation to evolve quickly, and to
be stable.
5. FINITELY MANY MESSAGES
One assumption which ís relatively non-standard is our assumption that players
have infinltely many messages. This assumplion ensures that lhere are always
messages which are (almost) unused, so that a mutant can use such messages to
coordinate upon the efficient outcome. We note that Kím and Sobel (1994) have to
make a similar assumption - they consider a finite population, restrict players to
use pure strategies and assume that there are more messages than players. We note
at thís point that with the introduction of noise, we do require infinitely many
messages, since otherwise we have an inefficiency result, with eíther formulation
of noise. More precísely, we have inefficiency unless we can make an assumption
about the relative importance of mutations versus noise.
The following example may clarify matters. Consider the game G1 and let M-
(1,2}. If a player sends any message, say message 1, with probability (1-n)
message 1 is received by the other player, and with probability n the other
message, message 2 is received. Consider the stability of the set of strategies
II(í„I.), which sends arbitrary messages and plays L irrespective of the message. It24
is clear that if we to are ahaw that Q(L,L) is not an ES set, we must show that one
of the pure strategies in it ia not a NSS. BAD is such a pure strategy; this sends
.essage 1 and plays L irrespective of the aessage. Consider the invading strategy
GOOD, whích sends message 2, and plays L if it receives 1, and H if ít receives
message 2. The payoffs when GOOD and BAD play each other are:
u(BAD,BAD) ~ 1 (S.1)
u(GOOD,BAD) ~ 1-n (5.2)
u(BAD,GOOD) - 1-n (5.3)
u(GOOD,GOOD) ~ 2(i-n)2 t n2 (5.4)
The expected payoff of GOOD in the mixed population is greater if its share e
is greater than the critical value, e'(n), which is given by:
E'(n) s n(1-n)i[1-n(1-n)1 (s.s)
e'(n) is of the same order as n, and in thís example is larger than n. Hence
mutations must be sufficiently ieportant as compared to the noise for BAD to be
invaded by GOOD. To put things differently, for every n, there exists a c'(n) such
that if the size of mutations is below this, the inefficient outcome belongs to an
FS set. This is formalized in the following proposition, which adopts the weak
definition of an ES set:
PROPOSITIODI 5 If a Ss strict Naeh equilibrium of G, there exists a weak ES
set of GM (resp. GN) which induces a.
Proof We show A(a) is a weak ES set, i.e. given n~0 3 e'(n) such that any x in
n(a) cannot be ínvaded by any y from outside. Fix n. Since M ís fínite, GM(n)
defines a flnite game. Since g is a strlct Nash equilibríum, u(y,x) ~ u(x,x), Vy t
9(a) and hence 3 an invasion barrier e'(r~). o
Reaark n(a) is not a strong FS set. S.e. there dces not exist e' such that
R(a) is an ES set of GM(n) with n arbitrarily small. To put ít differently, to get
even asymptotic efflciency in the presence of noise one has to assume that
mutations are nore i~portant than noise. This aay not be a reasonable assumption;'LS
noise can be seen as a random phenomenon, whereas mutations represent coordinated
deviations by a positive measure of a large population. In our view, the assumptfon
of infinitely many messages is more palatable.
6 CONCLUDING COMMF]dTS
There is a large llterature on how evolution ensures efficiency when mutants
are able to use actions to signal their ídentíties, and thereby coordínate a
devíation to the efficient outcome. Such possibíllties arise in the context of pre-
play communication as well as in repeated games. In the former context, we must
mention the work of Fudenberg and Maskin (1991), Kim and Sobel (1994), Matsui
(1991), Schlag (1994a, 1994b) and Warneryd (1991). In the repeated game context,
similar ideas have been used by Binmore and Samuelson (1992) and Fudenberg and
Maskin (1990). Since there already exists an excellent review of this literature
(Sobel, 1993), we have felt free to focus on the novel features of our approach.
The essence of our approach has been to obtain efficiency results which do not
rely upon drift. We do this by perturbing the game with pre-play communication. In
thls respect, we differ from most of the preceding literature, with the exeption of
Fudenberg and Maskin (1991). They also consider a model of pre-play communicatíon,
where players make mistakes. This model ís very similar to their paper on repeated
games (Fudenberg and Maskin, 1990). There are major differences between our
approach and theirs'. Flrst, they have to allow for infinitely many rounds of
communication. Second, they also have to assume that mistakes occur with
arbítrarily higlicr probability than mutations - in fact they assume that for any n,
n mistakes occur with higher order of probability than a single mutation. In
contrast, our model does requires only a single round of communication, and needs
make no assumption about the relative probabilíties of noise versus mutations.
Finally, our general efficiency result requires the device of noise rather than
mistakes.26
We conclude with the observation that the specification of noise introduced in
this paper may be of Sndependent interest, outside the evolutionary context. The
introduction of noise dramatically reduces the set of sequential equilibria of the
gaae. This is due to the fact that messages are not mutual knowledge between
players in a model wíth noise, even though they are arbitrarily close to beíng so.
Thus this formulation of noise may have wíder application, even Sn contexts where
players are assumed to be perfectly rational.27
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END NOTES
1 Thís mechanism may also not be robust; the strategy profile can drift from x to y
only if there are two exact equalities among the four possible payoffs which arise
when x and y are matched. These equalitíes may not be robust to perturbations in
the game.
2The importance of considering the speed of convergence to equilibrium has been
highlighted in the evolutionary context by Ellison (1993).
3x e S is Lyapunov stable if for every small neighborhood N(x)SS, there is another
neighborhood N'(x) such that every trajectory in N'(x) does not leave N(x). x is
asymptotically stable if x is Lyapunov stable and if 3 N"(x) such that every
traJectory ín N"(x) converges to x.
4These equívalences hold for finite games, but the methods of proof suggest that
the arguments should extend to bimatrix games with countably infinite strategy
sets.
S Warneryd (1991) obtains an efficíency result for G1 using neutral stability, but
considers only pure strategíes.
óWith a finite number of inessages, the mixed strategy is ín fact evolutionary
stable íf players cannot condition their strategies upon the role they fill, as Kim
and Sobel (1992) and Schlag (1994) point out. However, with infinitely many
messages, this strategy fails to be neutrally stable even if players cannot
conditíon upon roles.
~See for example Samuelson (1994) who finds that iteratively weakly domínated
strategies can be eliminated only if mistakes occur wíth higher order of
probability than mutatíons.30
sIt is interesting that the same example was Sndependently discussed by Kím and
Sobel (1992). This exampie posed a problem for them for quite different reasons -
the problem arises, in their framework, since players could use up all the messages
ln performing the randomization, leaving no unused messages. In our case the
problem is due to the "credibility" of punishments even in the presence of nolse, a
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